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 A REPLY TO SOME STANDARD OBJECTIONS TO EUTHANASIA 
 
 JOHN SHAND 
 
ABSTRACT: The purpose here is to point to the fact that some arguments one hears commonly 
aired (not necessarily those found primarily in the academic literature), which are generally 
thought to be objections to voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, are not as decisive as they 
are often thought to be. The arguments in question are mostly utilitarian and non-rights based 
in foundation. My aim is not to prove that euthanasia is morally vindicated (although I happen 
to think euthanasia is morally and practically desirable, and that rights based arguments are 
strong in this respect) but rather to raise some important talking points in the case of arguments 
where the assumption as to their decisive anti-euthanasia implications may lead us to overlook 
their lack of decisiveness and the fact that such arguments, if properly considered, can be made 
to point equally in the direction of supporting euthanasia. 
 
Many of the objections to euthanasia are grounded in utilitarianism. The general point that 
people have a right to determine the end of their own lives, and that the issue is simply a matter 
of personal autonomy over which others have no right to interfere, may be undercut by the 
utilitarian denial of absolute rights. The argument from rights alone seems to me decisive, but it 
is not the subject of my discussion here. The contention here is that significant non-rights based 
objections to euthanasia are refutable insofar as they purport to present themselves as decisive 
or even strong arguments. My chief target here is not primarily arguments found in the 
philosophical literature on euthanasia so much as arguments that are commonly heard but which 
may, despite their informal expression, have considerable influence on the general perception of 
euthanasia and legislators. 
 By `euthanasia' is here meant primarily voluntary euthanasia, although some 




person is in a position to confirm or deny that they wish their life ended. In the case of non-
voluntary euthanasia a person is in a position neither to affirm nor to deny that they wish to end 
their life. In the case of involuntary euthanasia a person's life is ended against their wishes. 
 
(1) One often heard objection to euthanasia is that its existence would put pressure on people 
(often in the imagined cases old people) to end their lives so as not to be a burden or a nuisance 
to others (often imagined to be relatives). The reply to this is that this argument cuts both ways. 
Because euthanasia is not now a practical option for most people, is illegal, carries with it a 
social stigma, and may have traumatic psychological consequences for relatives, many people 
feel forced to go on living when they would rather die. Moreover it is not usually noticed that 
the traumatic consequences that presently follow, or are imagined to follow, euthanasia are in 
large part only because it is not now acceptable. If it were to become acceptable the situation in 
which it took place would by that very fact be different. Most obviously it would become 
something that could be discussed openly with relatives and friends, rather than something as 
now which has to be conducted in secret and often in a manner that is inefficient and 
distressing, mixed with guilt and fear of detection. Here we have a case where the thing under 
examination changes its nature partly as a result of attitudes to it, and practices surrounding it, 
altering. Many of the difficulties perceived as following the introduction of euthanasia are based 
on both not seeing that its introduction would itself change the circumstances of its occurrence, 
and a false extrapolation from the circumstances of a situation where it does not yet occur - a 
self-fulfilling prophecy in fact.  One can conceive of social structures of various degrees of 
extension and formality building up around euthanasia analogous to those that now exist, say, 
around marriage and the decision to marry, and around birth and parenthood. 
  In addition it can be said that there may be nothing wrong with the decision to end one's 
life based on the opinion that one will be a burden - one may indeed be a burden, and there may 
be only so much the people who care for us can do to dissuade us of this view - it may be 





(2) It is said that euthanasia is uniquely objectionable because unlike other decisions it is, if 
enacted successfully, something we cannot change our minds about. This is false with respect to 
uniqueness and involves various confusions. 
 
 (a) Choosing to die is not the only irreversible major decision we take in life. If a couple 
decide to have children and succeed they cannot go back to the way they were before. Even if 
the children die, or the parents murder them, they cannot go back to being people who did not 
have children, or are not child murderers. This is indeed true of a great mass of decisions people 
take in their lives. Many decisions are taken in life which once done cannot be undone. This is 
so if only because time is unidirectional; but is even more plausible when one considers in 
addition aging. I cannot now choose to become a great concert violinist (having earlier decided 
not to pursue that course) no matter what my talent - it is simply too late. The same applies to 
my opening the batting for England. 
 
 (b) Another objection is that it makes no sense to say that somehow after someone is 
dead they might if they could change their minds. Indeed the very force of the argument against 
euthanasia from its being the last decision shows this. The very centre of the concern of the 
decision has ceased to exist. The objection posits either a perspective that is largely irrelevant 
(that of others) or a perspective that is senselessly hypothetical. Moreover it is not at all clear 
why its being the last decision should in itself make it objectionable. 
 
 (c) Again the objection (2) cuts both ways. If I choose not to demand euthanasia, and so 
go on to die in some other way, that too is a decision that I cannot reverse. I cannot then, after 
death, choose to die differently, say by euthanasia. Just as there might be cases of people who 
per impossible wish they had not chosen euthanasia, so there might be just as many who per 




an unwarranted assumption. Dying by euthanasia is tacitly assumed to be an act possessing only 
negative qualities, while the decision to keep on living is seen as having positive qualities - after 
all it will be said one is at least still alive. This ignores the fact that euthanasia may be chosen 
precisely for its positive qualities as against the negative qualities of continuing to live and 
dying without it. 
 
(3) The slippery slope argument. This I think can be challenged in two ways. But first it is 
necessary to distinguish between a logical and factual slippery slope. 
 In the case of the logical slippery slope it is claimed that the allowing of euthanasia at all 
logically entails countenancing cases that are morally objectionable, whether they in fact happen 
or not. This argument is very weak, and no more plausible than contending that because 
exercise is a good thing one is therefore committed to holding that one should do nothing else. 
 The factual slippery slope suggests that as a matter of fact the permitting of euthanasia 
will lead to morally objectionable acts whether they are logically entailed or not. The most 
significant issue here is the factual slippery slope. 
 
 (a) Again it is rarely noticed that the factual slippery slope argument, like the previous 
arguments, cuts both ways. Just as there may be cases where someone might connive to kill 
someone else without their genuinely wishing it (and might gain some advantage from doing 
so) so someone might connive to keep someone else alive against their wishes (and might gain 
some advantage from doing so; one might imagine a case where someone not dying prevents a 
hated sibling reaping the rewards of a will). It remains to be shown that those cases in which 
people gain advantage from killing someone are more numerous than those in which people 
gain advantage from keeping them alive. 
 
 (b) It might be said that endorsing euthanasia might weaken the prohibition on taking 




evidence that supports this claim. Indeed it might be said that the introduction of euthanasia, 
rather than weakening the value we place on life, actually strengthens it by ensuring that the life 
of the individual is not despoiled by its finishing in a degrading manner and by respecting the 
opinions of the individual. 
 
(4) It is sometimes objected that in the case of instructions (that might become an extension of 
`living wills'), which give the conditions under which an individual would want euthanasia to be 
enacted in their own case should they be unable to make a decision for themselves, how people 
feel when they are well might not be how they feel when they are ill - and that certain cases of 
reconsideration following recovery suggest this. This objection leaves entirely untouched the 
issues of voluntary euthanasia. Moreover it can again be pointed out that the argument cuts both 
ways. For all those cases of people who might change their minds it has not been shown that 
they equal or exceed cases of people who do not. Moreover there is the side-effect of the 
distress caused to relatives who are unable to act on their loved one's last known wish, a wish 
that by its very nature will not be revoked, thereby causing the relatives guilt. 
 
(5) It is said that the permitting of euthanasia would undermine the trust between doctor and 
patient. But this argument simply begs the question. The trust that a patient puts in a doctor 
could equally be the trust that the doctor will at the very least cease pointless treatment and 
might indeed actively hasten death when the patient requests it. The trust between patient and 
doctor is that the doctor will do his best for the patient; it begs the question to assume that this 
will consist in not carrying out acts of euthanasia. 
 
(6) It is sometimes argued that euthanasia is unnecessary because the death of the individual can 
be `managed' successfully by various palliative measures, particularly pain control. There are 





 (a) What counts as intolerable suffering leading an individual to request euthanasia is 
necessarily and rightly a subjective matter. A degrading bed-ridden life stricken with 
incontinence, or even one involving a major dependence on others in any way, may be 
intolerable to an individual. Even if people can help, it seems reasonable that someone might 
find having to be helped in a major way itself abhorrent. 
 
 (b) Pain is not the only issue. This is in addition to the point about the subjectivity of 
what is intolerable. Certain conditions do not involve pain (narrowly defined) at all; a condition 
may lead to death by asphyxiation for which no amount of pain relief as such will do any good 
at all. Strokes leave previously intelligent people mentally crippled and often hugely distressed 
at their condition; again pain is not the issue and pain control is of no value. Of course there is 
the possibility of palliation of conditions other than those involving pain. But in many cases it is 
difficult to see what palliation is possible or if possible that it is sufficient. If someone is 
sufferring from a fatal progressive paralysis, the mere tragic contrast in that person's mind 
between what they once were and what they have become may be sufficient to make that 
person's life intolerable to them - it is very hard to see what form of palliation could do any good 
in a situation like this. The twists and turns as to what constitutes an intolerable state to be in for 
a particular individual are extremely conplex and subtle, and it could be argued that it is 
presumptive to decide this matter for another. The intolerable nature of their lives may be the 
mere perception of the fact of their condition, and no palliation can affect this fact for otherwise, 
necessarily, the palliation would not be required.  
 
Most of the above refutations to the standard objections to euthanasia have depended on 
pointing out that the arguments cut both ways - of course this means the arguments can count 
for euthanasia as well, although they now have to be shown to do so - however, it is the 
assumption that the arguments only work one way and the oversight of the implication that they 




that the arguments are two-way at the very least eliminates the decisive quality of the arguments 
against euthanasia. It also opens the discussion up as to which way the arguments do in fact 
point. In the opinion of this author the evidence lies in the direction of euthanasia. This is 
bolstered by the argument that individuals have a right to choose the means and time of their 
death, which may stand independently of consequentialist considerations. 
 
Dr John Shand, The Open University. 
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